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Accordingly, under the State and Federal Constitutions the
Double Jeopardy Clause will bar a second trial of the defendant
only where the prosecutor intentionally caused or provoked the
defendant to make a motion for a mistrial. In applying the facts in
Mitchell under the State and Federal Constitutions, the defendant
could only be afforded protection under the Double Jeopardy
Clause if he could prove that the prosecutor intentionally acted to
cause the defendant to move for a mistrial. However, without a
showing of this type of prosecutorial misconduct, reprosecution
of the defendant will not be precluded by the Double Jeopardy
Clause. Thus, the court in Mitchell, which held that
reprosecution of the defendant was not barred by the Double
Jeopardy Clause because there was no evidence of prosecutorial
misconduct, is in accord with the State and Federal Constitutions.
THIRD DEPARTMENT
People v. Lowe30 8
(decided June 3, 1993)

Defendant challenged his criminal conviction, which followed a
mistrial and a second trial, and claimed that relitigation was
prohibited by the Double Jeopardy Clauses of the State 30 9 and
Federal 3 10 Constitutions. 311 The court held that because it was
the defendant himself who requested a mistrial during the original
proceedings, retrial of the action was not improper. 3 12
On November 1, 1991, defendant was convicted on two counts
of "criminal possession of a weapon in the third degree" 3 13 in
308. 194 A.D.2d 825, 598 N.Y.S.2d 613 (3d Dep't 1993).

309. N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 6. Section 6 provides in part: "No person shall
be subject to be twice put in jeopardy for the same offense." Id.
310. U.S. CONST. amend. V. The Fifth Amendment states in pertinent part:
"No person shall be... subject for the same offence to be twice put in
jeopardy of life or limb." Id.
311. Lowe, 194 A.D.2d at 826,598 N.Y.S.2d at 614.
312. Id.
313. Id.at 825, 598 N.Y.S.2d at 613-14.
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Broome County Supreme Court. 3 14 On appeal, the defendant set
forth several points of contention, all of which were rejected by
the appellate division. 3 15 Most significantly, the defendant
claimed that "there should be a reversal and dismissal of the
indictment because he was tried in violation of the double
jeopardy proscriptions of the Federal and State Constitutions." 3 16
Defendant's claim was based upon the fact that during the first
trial it was discovered that defense counsel previously
represented the prosecution witness in a separate criminal
matter. 3 17 Upon this finding, the "County Court immediately
conducted a Gomberg inquiry," 3 18 and determined that the
defendant wanted a mistrial and a new attorney. 3 19 Consequently,
defendant's application for a mistrial was granted, and a new trial
was conducted in supreme court. 320 Nevertheless, defendant
maintained that "because the People were aware of the conflict
prior to commencement of the first trial, their failure to reveal
the conflict to the court and defendant dictates dismissal of the
indictment."321 In response, the court cited People v.
Wandell,322 where, in spite of the reversal of defendant's
conviction, was because of counsel's failure to alert the trial
court as to a conflict of interest, a new trial was warranted. 32 3
Ultimately, the appellate division held that "[i]nasmuch as
314. Id.
315. Id. at 825-86, 598 N.Y.S.2d at 614. The defendant claimed
insufficient evidence to sustain conviction, violation of double jeopardy
protection, unlawful search and seizure of handgun, and trial was not timely
commenced. Id.
316. Id. at 826, 598 N.Y.S.2d at 614.
317. Id.
318. Id.; People v. Gomberg, 38 N.Y.2d 307, 342 N.E.2d 550, 379
N.Y.S.2d 769 (1975). "What is required is that when two or more defendants
are represented by the same attorney, the trial court ascertain, on the record,
whether each defendant has an awareness of the potential risks involved in that
course and has knowingly chosen -it." Id. at 313-14, 342 N.E.2d at 554, 379
N.Y.S.2d at 775 (citations omitted).
319. Lowe, 194 A.D.2d at 826, 598 N.Y.S.2d at 614.
320. Id.
321. Id.
322. 75 N.Y.2d 951, 554 N.E.2d 1274, 555 N.Y.S.2d 686 (1990).
323. Id. at 953, 554 N.E.2d at 1275, 555 N.Y.S.2d at 687.
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defendant sought the mistrial, retrial of the action is not
32 4
barred."
The New York Court of Appeals set forth the broad mandates
of the Double Jeopardy Clause in People v. Catten.325 The court
stated that
[t]he Double Jeopardy Clauses of both the Federal and State
Constitutions prohibit a person's being placed in jeopardy twice
for the same offense. Thus, retrial will be barred after the
declaration of a mistrial without the defendant's consent unless 'it
is physically impossible to proceed with the trial in conformity
with law' or there was 'manifest necessity' for the mistrial or
32 6
'the ends of public justice would otherwise be defeated.
However, despite the general principles enunciated, the court
stated that when the defendant himself moves for a mistrial, he
"waives his double jeopardy protections" and thus, retrial is not
prohibited "regardless of whether there was manifest necessity
for the mistrial."327 In addition, relying on People v.
Ferguson,32 8 the Catten court noted that "a defendant need not
agree with counsel, or even be in the courtroom when counsel
moves for a mistrial, for the motion to be binding on him. "329
Furthermore, New York courts have stated that when "a mistrial
was ordered at the request of the petitioner, and there is no
evidence of bad faith or an intention by the prosecutor to provoke

324. Lowe, 194 A.D.2d at 826, 598 N.Y.S.2d at 614.
325. 69 N.Y.2d 547, 508 N.E.2d 920, 516 N.Y.S.2d 186 (1987).
326. Id. at 553-54, 508 N.E.2d at 924, 516 N.Y.S.2d at 189 (citations
omitted).

327. Id. at 554, 508 N.E.2d at 924, 516 N.Y.S.2d at 190 (citations
omitted). See also People v. Ferguson, 67 N.Y.2d 383, 494 N.E.2d 77, 502
N.Y.S.2d 972 (1986). "[W]here the defendant either requests a mistrial or
consents to its declaration, the double jeopardy clauses do not ordinarily bar a
second trial." Id. at 388, 494 N.E.2d at 80, 502 N.Y.S.2d at 975 (citations
omitted). Accord People v. Reardon, 126 A.D.2d 974, 511 N.Y.S.2d 748 (4th
Dep't 1987).

328. 67 N.Y.2d 383, 494 N.E.2d 77, 502 N.Y.S.2d 972 (1986).
329. Catten, 69 N.Y.2d at 556, 508 N.E.2d at 925, 516 N.Y.S.2d at 191.
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protections."

330

The Federal Double Jeopardy Clause has the same effect as the
New York provision. 33 1 The justification for this constitutional
protection is set forth in United States v. Dinitz. The court stated:
Underlying this constitutional safeguard is the belief that 'the
State with all its resources and power should not be allowed to
make repeated attempts to convict an individual for an alleged
offense, thereby subjecting him to embarrassment, expense and
ordeal and compelling him to live in a continuing state of anxiety
and insecurity, as well as enhancing the possibility that even
3 32
though innocent he may be found guilty.'

Further, when it is the defendant himself who requests a mistrial
in a prior proceeding, the Supreme Court has stated that "the
Double Jeopardy Clause is not offended by a second
prosecution. "333
Finally, as a guideline to aid in the implementation of the
Double Jeopardy Clause, the Dinitz Court stated that "[tihe
important consideration, for purposes of the Double Jeopardy
Clause, is that the defendant retain primary control over the
course to be followed in the event of such error." 3 3 4 In the case
at bar, since the defendant himself submitted the application for a

mistrial, it is impossible to say that the defendant did not have
control over the course of events. Thus, applying either the

330. Pierre-Lewis v. Tomei, 157 A.D.2d 661, 662, 549 N.Y.S.2d 763, 764
(2d Dep't 1990); see also People v. Woodward, 127 A.D.2d 929, 512
N.Y.S.2d 513 (3d Dep't 1987). "When a defendant requests a mistrial, double
jeopardy does not preclude another trial unless the underlying error which
brought on the defendant's motion was caused by governmental conduct
intended to provoke the defendant into moving for a mistrial." Id. at 931, 512
N.Y.S.2d at 515 (citations omitted).
331. United States v. Dinitz, 424 U.S. 600, 606 (1976) ("The Double
Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment protects a defendant in a criminal
proceeding against multiple punishments or repeated prosecutions for the same
offense.").
332. Id. (citing Green v. United States 355 U.S. 184, 187-88 (1957)).
333. United States v. Scott, 437 U.S. 82, 93 (1978).
334. Dinitz, 424 U.S. at 609.
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Federal or New York State Double Jeopardy Clause,
defendant's rights were not violated by the second trial.
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